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Household-level portfolio data show a tendency of the majority of households in 
each country to hold no stocks despite a historical expected-return premium on equity 
relative to riskless assets. This paper first explains why such a tendency constitutes a 
puzzle in economic theory (the “stockholding puzzle”). It discusses why simple popular 
notions regarding the source of non-participation (risk aversion, risky labor income, and 
borrowing constraints) are not confirmed by careful analysis of portfolio models and 
presents recent conclusions on what causes non-participation. Based on this, it revisits 
the popular view on non-participation and shows how it can be qualified to be 
consistent with lessons from economic theory. It also explains how this view can be 
extended to account for exits from the stock market and for limited diversification. 
Then, the paper describes three unsolved empirical puzzles concerning the share of 
stocks in portfolios of households that do participate in the stock market. It points to 
basic underlying mechanisms producing these theoretical results and discusses briefly 
possible future directions for research that may help resolve the puzzles. Finally, the 
paper draws lessons for practitioners interested in expanding the stockholder base. 
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This paper presents recent developments in the theory of optimal portfolio design in a 
non-technical manner, provides the intuition behind these results, and uses them to 
interpret important findings in the empirical literature based on high-quality, household-
level portfolio data. Where theoretical predictions are confirmed by empirical 
observation, theory provides a way to interpret empirical findings. Where the two 
disagree, the mechanisms stressed by theory serve as a first step towards identifying the 
full set of factors at work and the extent to which household behavior can be modified to 
fit objectives better.  
Household-level portfolio data show a tendency of the majority of households in 
each country to hold no stocks despite a historical expected-return premium on equity 
relative to riskless assets. The paper first explains why such a tendency constitutes a 
puzzle in economic theory (the “stockholding puzzle”). It discusses why popular notions 
regarding the source of non-participation (risk aversion, risky labor income, and 
borrowing constraints) are not confirmed by careful analysis of portfolio models and 
presents the state-of-the-art view on what causes non-participation. Based on this, it 
revisits the popular view on non-participation and shows how it can be qualified to be 
consistent with lessons from economic theory. It also explains how this view can be 
extended to account for exits from the stock market and for limited diversification.  
Then, the paper describes three unsolved empirical puzzles concerning the share 
of stocks in portfolios of households that do participate in the stock market. It points to 
the sources of theoretical results on optimal portfolio composition
1 and discusses briefly 
                                                 
1 Gollier (2001 a, b) provides an excellent discussion of the portfolio implications of models that can be 
solved exactly using analytical methods, which complements the analysis in this paper. Campbell and 
  1possible future directions for research that may help resolve the puzzles. Finally, the 
paper draws lessons from theory that can be of use to practitioners in their efforts to 
expand the stockholder base. 
Section 2 discusses the main factors that are likely to prevent households from 
participating in the stock market. Section 3 examines what might cause households that 
previously held stocks to exit the stock market, while section 4 distinguishes stock market 
participation from portfolio diversification. Section 5 investigates whether households 
that do participate in the stock market choose an optimal portfolio share of stocks as the 
latter is implied by theory. Section 6 draws lessons from the theory of household 
portfolios that can be useful to practitioners.  
 
2.  The stock market participation puzzle 
2.1.  What is the participation puzzle and why do we care? 
Despite substantial increases in stock market participation among households over the 
last decade, there is no country in the world where the majority of households hold 
stocks. This is true not only for European countries surveyed in the current project, but 
also for the United States where only 19% of households hold stocks directly according 
to the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances. It remains true even when we allow for 
indirect holdings of stock through mutual funds and defined-contribution pension funds: 
the participation rate for the US then rises to just under 49%. This happens in the face of 
substantial realized stock returns in the later part of the 1990s,and despite estimates of an 
expected return premium on equity based on long historical time series (of the order of 4 
                                                                                                                                                 
Viceira (2002) provide a very useful, in-depth discussion of various aspects of portfolio theory, including 
lessons from models using analytical approximations. 
  2to 6 percentage points in the United States). The puzzle can be stated simply: if one can 
expect to earn more by holding stocks than by holding essentially riskless financial assets 
(such as bank deposits), what is it that keeps the majority of households out of the stock 
market? 
Resolving this puzzle is not simply a matter of intellectual curiosity, but can 
suggest important profit opportunities for financial institutions, practitioners, and even 
governments. If we understand what keeps people out of the stock market, we can expand 
the customer base by designing financial products that appeal to the average household. 
We can also market financial products more effectively by targeting appropriate 
segments of the population. Governments can ensure the maximum effectiveness of their 
efforts to float stock of newly privatized companies. Finally, we may be able to speculate 
about the likely reactions of households to recent reversals in stock market performance 
on both sides of the Atlantic: are the new stockholders likely to stay in the market or are 
they likely to abandon ship in bad weather? 
 
2.2.  The Source of the Participation Puzzle 
Most people are unlikely to perceive a serious stock market participation puzzle. The 
most common instinctive reaction to this puzzle is that households tend not to participate 
in the stock market because they do not like to assume substantial financial risk. This 
view is strengthened by two observations. First, households face background risk arising 
from uncertain labor income or unpredictable health expenditures that they are unable to 
insure against. Assuming stockholding risk on top of this probably seems excessive to 
most households. Second, households face borrowing limits and may not be able to 
  3borrow against future earnings. If they cannot borrow, why should they sacrifice their 
precious current resources on stockholding, especially when they are also unlikely to be 
able to borrow in the future in order to offset consumption effects of bad stock market 
outcomes? A clear lesson from economic theory, whether based on analytical or on 
computational methods, is that such instinctive answers are too simplistic. Let us see 
why. 
A risk-averse household that maximizes expected utility will always want to 
invest some, albeit small, amount in stocks if stocks offer an expected return premium 
over the riskless asset.
2 The intuition behind this result stems from the idea that a risk 
averse household dislikes riskiness of its consumption stream. It will, therefore, evaluate 
all assets not only according to their expected returns but also according to the 
contribution each asset makes to the riskiness of the consumption stream. If a risky asset 
offers a higher expected return than a riskless asset, then it will be deemed superior to the 
riskless asset unless the household values its contribution to riskiness of consumption 
more than its contribution to the expected return on the portfolio.  
Consider a household with riskless labor income and no stocks in its portfolio that 
contemplates adding a small amount of stocks versus adding an equal amount of the 
riskless asset. Since there is an expected return premium on stocks, stocks are more 
attractive than the riskless asset in this respect. If the household is to be discouraged from 
undertaking stock investment, stocks must contribute to the riskiness of consumption. But 
since the household holds no stocks, stock returns are not correlated with the household’s 
consumption and a marginal addition of stocks does not contribute to consumption 
                                                 
2 An early statement of this result is in Arrow (1974). 
  4riskiness. A marginal addition of stocks should be preferred to a marginal addition of the 
riskless asset by someone that holds no stocks.  Of course, this holds for small additions 
of stocks starting from no stocks. Once households include stocks in their portfolios, their 
risk aversion will clearly influence the amount they do invest in stocks. Risk aversion is 
irrelevant for whether they hold stocks in this basic setup, not for the portfolio share of 
stocks among stockholders. 
The argument holds even when labor income is risky or when the household faces 
other sources of background risk, as long as such risk is uncorrelated with stock returns.
3 
It continues to hold even if the household is not allowed to be a net borrower (in the sense 
of having negative net wealth) in any period of life. This is because constraints on net 
wealth (the algebraic sum of assets and liabilities) treat each component of this sum 
symmetrically, and they fail to reverse the superiority of stocks to riskless assets for a 
household that has no holdings of stock.
4 
Thus usual notions of risk aversion and standard types of risky labor income and 
borrowing constraints cannot induce an optimizing household to adopt a zero position in 
stocks in the face of a perceived expected return premium over riskless assets (Haliassos 
and Bertaut, 1995). On the basis of the discussion so far, there seems to be no basis for 
the popular belief that non-participation in the stock market can be attributed to these 
reasons. But later on we will see how this popular belief can be modified to be consistent 
with our theoretical understanding of stockholding behavior. 
 
                                                 
3 If there is negative correlation between labor incomes and stock returns, then this provides an 
additional reason to hold stocks, namely as an insurance against earnings fluctuations. The case of positive 
correlation poses subtler issues, and we will return to it below. 
4 It should be stressed that this discussion refers to constraints on net wealth. We will see below that 
borrowing constraints of other types can justify zero stockholding. 
  52.3.  Could a Different Type of Risk Aversion account for Non-participation? 
Realization that the standard notion of aversion to financial risk embodied in 
expected-utility models of portfolio choice cannot account for non-participation in the 
stock market has encouraged attempts to consider alternative specifications of household 
preferences. Put simply, researchers have explored the idea that grandma may be right in 
attributing non-participation to risk aversion but we may have been too conservative in 
the way we model risk aversion. 
In standard models, households are assumed to compute the utility of each possible 
consumption outcome and weight it by the probability of its occurrence. The optimal 
portfolio is then chosen so as to maximize expected utility of consumption. Note that this 
specification is flexible enough to allow for very low utility in bad states of the world. 
The investor may be quite miserable if his portfolio returns end up being very bad, but he 
is still assumed to weight the probability of such misery by its objective probability of 
occurrence. 
What could happen if the investor weighted the probability of misery much more 
heavily than its objective probability of occurrence (with suitable modifications to the 
rest of the probability weights so that they sum to unity)? A first reaction maybe to say 
that not much will happen. After all, what matters for a household is the weight assigned 
to each outcome times the utility arising from the outcome. Standard preferences allow us 
to consider cases where the investor experiences very low utility in bad outcomes, so the 
ability to manipulate the first term in the product, the weight, may not seem to add much 
to our ability to explain zero stockholding. Yet such a reaction would be wrong. Powerful 
portfolio effects emerge when weights (and hence the household’s objective function) 
  6depend on the ranking  of outcomes that can be influenced by portfolio choices. 
Depending on the particular assumptions underlying the weighting scheme, this approach 
has been termed “rank-dependent utility”, “dual theory of choice”, and “probability 
weighting”.
5 
Consider a simple example in which stock returns can either take a high or a low 
value, and this is the only source of uncertainty facing the household with zero stocks in 
its portfolio. The household contemplates investing a positive amount in stocks. If it does 
so, then the good outcome for the household is to experience a high stock return, and the 
bad is to experience a low stock return. Suppose that the household can also short stocks, 
i.e. borrow an amount today by offering to deliver a certain number of stocks tomorrow. 
In this case, the household borrows at the risky stock return rate, and the good outcome is 
for stock returns to turn out low. This means that, starting from zero stockholding, a 
household with non-standard preferences will be using different weights to evaluate the 
utility resulting from positive investment in stocks than the weights it will be using to 
evaluate the results from short sales of stock. It thus becomes possible for the household 
to prefer zero stockholding to either positive holdings or short sales (Epstein and Zin, 
1990).
6 
This novel type of aversion to risk, termed “first-order risk aversion” seemed 
capable of generating and justifying zero stockholding. However, it turns out that labor 
income risk invalidates this possibility for resolving the stock market participation 
puzzle. As the simple example without background labor income risk illustrated, 
                                                 
5 See Quiggin, 1982; Yaari, 1987; Epstein and Zin, 1990; Haliassos and Hassapis, 2001; Donkers, 2000. 
6 Technically, indifference curves under such specifications exhibit kinks, thus making it possible for an 
investor to be “stuck” at one of those kinks for a range of slopes of the budget line. 
  7stockholding levels at which the household can be “stuck” are those around which 
reversals in rankings of outcomes take place. The crucial question is whether the 
objective function changes at zero stockholding, thus justifying non-participation in the 
stock market. When the labor income realization also matters for the ranking of 
outcomes, it can be shown that reversals in rankings do not in general occur at zero 
stockholding.
7 Recent computational research has indeed demonstrated that 
overweighting of the worst state cannot justify by itself nonparticipation in the stock 
market (Haliassos and Hassapis, 2001). Other weighting schemes that overweight the 
worst and the best states relative to their objective probabilities of occurrence have also 
been shown to result in predictions of positive stock holdings (Donkers, 2000). 
Overall, rank-dependent utility can lower predicted stockholding considerably, but 
it cannot by itself account for non-participation in the stock market of households that do 
face uninsurable background risk (such as earnings risk). However, the tendency of such 
preferences to lower predicted stockholding can be useful when combined with a 
different fundamental explanation for zero stockholding, as will be discussed below. 
 
2.4.  How About Correlation between Labor Incomes and Stock Returns? 
We saw above that risky labor income does not justify zero stockholding when earnings 
shocks are uncorrelated to stock returns, because it does not induce correlation between 
stock returns and household consumption. Other households with risky labor income that 
tends to move in the opposite direction from stock returns can even reduce consumption 
                                                 
7 In the example, the two relevant states with ambiguous ranking are (rH, YL) and (rL, YH), where r is 
the return on stocks, Y is labor income, H denotes the high realization, and L denotes the low realization.  
Reversal in the rankings does not occur at zero stockholding, but at that (positive) level of stockholding for 
which the difference in portfolio income exactly offsets the difference in labor income across the two 
states. Ranking reversals for other states can be ruled out through a more sophisticated argument. 
  8risk by including stocks in their portfolios. However, households whose labor incomes 
tend to move in the same direction as stock returns lower their demand for stocks for this 
reason. Theory tells us that such households may well find it optimal to sell stocks short, 
i.e. to borrow at the risky rate of return on stocks. For those who engage in short sales of 
stock, having low stock returns is the “good” outcome and high stock returns the “bad” 
outcome. If low (high) stock returns tend to occur when earnings are also low (high), 
short sales of stock can help mitigate some of the adverse consequences of low earnings. 
Still, short sales are far from implying abstention from the stock market. If anything, they 
require more stock market involvement by households and impose heavy informational 
requirements on them, since the process and the rules governing short sales tend to be 
quite involved.  
Thus, positive correlation between earnings and stock returns cannot be used by 
itself as an explanation for zero stockholding. Theory and computational studies indicate, 
however, that we can obtain optimal portfolios with zero stockholding if the household 
faces sufficiently high positive correlation between labor income and stock returns 
combined with restrictions preventing households from engaging in short sales of stock 
(Heaton and Lucas, 2000a, b; Haliassos and Michaelides, 1999). 
A theoretical possibility is not necessarily a valid explanation of an observed 
phenomenon. Despite the mathematical sophistication of portfolio models with positive 
correlation, the relevance of positive correlation and short-sales constraints as an 
explanation of the zero stockholding puzzle is ultimately an empirical matter. Survey data 
in many countries have established that households that do not participate in the stock 
market tend to be low-education, low-income, low-wealth, and more risk averse than 
  9those that do participate. On a purely introspective level, it is hard to imagine that such 
households hold no stocks because they tried to sell stocks short and found out that they 
were unable to do so.  
Luckily, there is more to rely on than mere introspection. The few existing 
empirical studies of the correlation between earnings shocks and stock returns at the 
household level find rather small, if any, positive correlation and more importantly a 
pattern of estimated correlations across household groups that is inconsistent with their 
relative tendencies to abstain from the stock market. Davis and Willen (2000) obtain 
correlation estimates ranging between .1 and .3 over most of the working life for college 
educated males and around -.25 at all ages for male high school dropouts Heaton and 
Lucas (2000b) estimate positive correlation of entrepreneurial risk with stock returns at 
levels around .2. Besides being fairly small, these numbers imply at best that zero 
stockholding should be predominant among college graduates or entrepreneurs who in 
fact tend to hold stocks, and that low education households should actually hold stocks as 
a hedging instrument when in fact they tend not to do so. Thus, the theoretical possibility 
notwithstanding, it does not seem that positive correlation between earnings and stock 
returns can account for the observed pattern of zero stockholding across different 
population segments. 
Further empirical support to the notion that earnings-return correlations are not 
central to stockholding behavior is provided by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). She uses 
income data from the PSID (1983-1992), and three observations of portfolio choice from 
the 1984, 1989, and 1994 PSID wealth supplements. She applies a two-step procedure, 
first estimating relevant moments of the income processes and then using them as 
  10regressors to explain portfolio choice. She finds no evidence of an effect of the earnings-
return correlation on portfolio composition. 
 
2.5.  Can Borrowing Constraints Justify Zero Stockholding? 
The third commonly invoked factor for stock market non-participation is the inability of 
some households to borrow as much as is warranted by their expected lifetime earnings 
and any accumulated wealth. Such borrowing constraints can arise from various types of 
imperfections in the credit market, they can take various forms (such as quantity 
constraints, wedges between borrowing and saving interest rates, down-payment ratios), 
and they have been extensively explored in the literature on saving. 
Why would a constraint on borrowing  preclude somebody from investing  in 
stocks? The idea is that people with low current resources, especially the young among 
them, would like to borrow both in order to consume and to invest in stocks, in view of 
higher expected future earnings and of the expected return premium on equity. 
Restrictions on their ability to do so would force them to curtail both their consumption 
and their stock investment and might push them to a corner with zero stockholding. 
It should already be clear that zero stockholding cannot arise from any arbitrary 
type of borrowing constraints faced by households. As mentioned above, a constraint that 
restricts overall financial net wealth to be nonnegative does not induce zero stockholding. 
Since this constraint restricts the algebraic sum of assets and liabilities, it does not 
prevent positive stockholding financed entirely through borrowing in a way that leaves 
net financial wealth unaffected. More generally, a non-negativity constraint on net wealth 
allows stockholding as long as the size of debt outstanding is matched by the size of total 
  11asset holdings. More stringent borrowing constraints are needed if we are to justify zero 
stockholding. 
What if the household is not allowed to borrow at all at the riskless rate, 
regardless of what it would do with the loan? Under this rather extreme type of 
borrowing constraint, young low-resource households that would have liked to short the 
riskless asset will end up holding none of it. Will they also end up holding no stocks? Not 
necessarily. Computational studies (such as Heaton and Lucas, 1997, 2000a; and 
Haliassos and Michaelides, 1999, 2001) have found that young households that are 
particularly impatient (that is, eager to boost their consumption by borrowing against 
their future earnings) may even seek to borrow by shorting stocks. Zero stockholding is 
not justified even by ruling out borrowing at the low riskless rate. 
However, if there is an additional restriction preventing short sales of stock, then 
sufficiently impatient households will be eager to borrow at either the riskless or the risky 
rate and, prevented from doing so, they will end up with zero holdings of both assets.
8 
Although it is the combination of these two severe borrowing restrictions that produces 
zero stockholding, the second assumption of no short sales of stock is not inconsistent 
with the first. Young households that are denied credit even at the riskless rate are 
unlikely to be allowed to engage in short sales at the stock exchange. The possibility 
seems both theoretically valid and intuitively plausible. 
Is it also empirically relevant in accounting for observed non-stockholders? The 
computational models themselves provide some guidance as to the characteristics of 
optimizing households that could run into both short sales constraints and thus exhibit 
                                                 
8 Technically, the imposition of two separate short sales constraints, one on stocks and the other on 
bonds, breaks the symmetry of treatment between bonds and stocks by allowing the shadow values of these 
two constraints to differ. 
  12zero stockholding. Contributing factors are young age, low current cash on hand,
9 and 
considerable impatience that induces households to want to borrow at either rate. The 
findings of Cocco, Gomes, Maenhout (1999) and Haliassos and Michaelides (2001) 
imply that a crucial factor behind the influence of age on portfolios is the large ratio of 
human wealth (the present value of expected future earnings) to accumulated financial 
wealth typically observed when households are young.
10 
It should be stressed that this borrowing-constraint explanation of zero 
stockholding applies at best only to households that hold no assets at all, risky or riskless. 
Thus, it cannot explain the behavior of households who choose to put all their savings in 
bank accounts and other riskless assets. Nor does it apply to households with large 
amounts of cash on hand because of high current incomes (or asset holdings), as these are 
predicted to invest positive amounts in stocks. This makes it virtually impossible to apply 
this explanation to savers, and especially the wealthier or middle- to high-income non-
stockholders in household-level data. Moreover, the relevance of binding borrowing 
constraints tends to diminish as households age and climb the upward-sloping age-
earnings profile. Binding borrowing constraints are far from being a universal 
explanation of the widespread non-participation in the stock market observed to different 
extents across age, income and wealth groups. 
 
                                                 
9 Cash on hand is defined as the sum of current wealth and of labor income, and it is normalized by 
either current labor income or by the permanent component of labor income. 
10 Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout offer a possible intuitive explanation for why this ratio matters so much 
for portfolio composition. Future labor income, though risky, has a positive minimum value in each future 
period. This value is guaranteed without risk, in the sense that the household will receive at least this labor 
income in each future period. Thus, it serves as a surrogate riskless asset, displacing (some of) the riskless 
asset that the household would otherwise include in its portfolio and encouraging the household to devote 
more of its financial wealth to stocks. As age progresses and the household gets closer to retirement, the 
importance of this labor income floor diminishes and households are predicted to shift their portfolios more 
into the riskless asset and away from stocks. 
  132.6.  Fixed Entry and Participation Costs: Could Grandma Still Have a Point? 
Economic theory serves to sharpen our understanding of economic phenomena but has 
seldom proved popular beliefs and intuition to be totally unfounded. While economic 
theory challenges the popular notion that risk aversion, uncertain earnings, and borrowing 
limitations are sufficient to account for zero stockholding in the face of an equity return 
premium, it does not imply that these factors are irrelevant to stock market non-
participation. Indeed, the prevailing current view in the theory of stock market 
participation seems to be that all these factors contribute to non-participation in the face 
of another, more fundamental factor. 
This fundamental factor is fixed costs of entry or participation in the stock market, 
broadly interpreted. Households are assumed to decide whether to pay the cost of 
obtaining access to stocks or not based on a comparison of well being (expected lifetime 
utilities) under both options. One option is to gain access to stocks but having to pay the 
costs, while the other saves the costs but gives access only to riskless assets (Haliassos 
and Bertaut, 1995; Haliassos and Michaelides, 1999; Polkovnichenko, 2000). 
Some entry or participation costs are tangible and observable, while others are 
much more difficult to quantify. Households usually have to pay a certain fee to engage 
the services of brokers or to participate in a mutual fund. In addition, they need to spend 
some time selecting advisors and investment programs, picking winners, and generally 
keeping up with developments in the stock market. We may be able to measure or at least 
approximate the value of a household’s time spent on such activities, by considering the 
opportunity cost of this time. In practice, it will be quite difficult to have reliable 
  14estimates of the number of hours spent by the household on such activities, and this may 
contaminate estimates with sizeable measurement error. 
Far more difficult to assess are household’s perceptions as to how much it would 
cost to get involved in stockholding activities, monitor financial advisors or fund 
operators, and keep abreast of stock market developments. Yet, it is household 
perceptions that ultimately determine whether the household will enter the stock market, 
and exaggerated perceptions can generate inertia despite their inaccuracy.
11 
Thus, it seems almost impossible to infer the perceived entry/participation cost for 
each household. However, it is possible to compute the minimum level of entry cost that 
would keep a household of given characteristics out of the stock market (Haliassos and 
Michaelides, 1999; Polkovnichenko, 2000, Paiella, 2000, Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). The 
conclusion from existing computational and econometric work on this issue is that such 
threshold entry costs tend to be fairly small.  
The main intuition for why small costs deter marginal investors from entry in the 
stock market is that, if these potential investors entered, they would invest very little in 
stocks anyway. If the planned stock investment is limited, then benefits from entry are 
relatively small, and small entry costs can discourage stock market participation. 
Although it is not possible to compare the computed costs to the objective costs of entry 
for each household, the low levels of such required costs for various household 
                                                 
11 It is worth noting that household perceptions relevant for the participation choice are not confined to 
perceptions about entry costs alone. They notably include household perceptions as to the size of the equity 
premium. The larger the perceived premium on the expected return on equity, the more likely is the 
household to participate in the stock market for any given level of perceived entry costs. Econometric 
research has shown that the size of the equity premium is difficult to estimate, even with full access to 
available historical data (Cochrane, 1997). Moreover, full knowledge of the equity premium is unlikely for 
households that have never invested in the stock market and are contemplating entry for the first time. The 
formation of perceptions and their influence on both the decision of households to enter and the threshold 
costs computed by researchers are useful areas for future research. 
  15characteristics suggest that an entry cost explanation of the participation puzzle could 
apply to a wide range of households. 
A bridge between popular beliefs about stock market nonparticipation and modern 
research on entry costs should now be apparent. Although risk aversion, earnings risk, 
and borrowing constraints are incapable of explaining widespread zero stockholding 
alone, they all serve to reduce the amount of stockholding that a household would 
undertake if it had access to the stock market. In so doing, they also serve to reduce the 
threshold entry costs sufficient to keep households out of the stock market. Thus, for any 
objective level of entry costs, households that are more risk averse, or disproportionately 
concerned about bad outcomes, or face considerable background earnings risk, or severe 
borrowing and short sales constraints are more likely to stay out of the stock market. 
Rather than being protagonists, as commonly thought, these factors are regarded by 
modern economic theory as supporting actors in a show produced by stock market entry 
and participation costs. 
 
3.  Accounting for stock market exits 
Up to now, I have referred to “entry” and “participation” costs almost interchangeably. 
One is forced to draw a distinction between these two concepts when looking more 
closely at the evolution of stock market participation patterns of households over time. 
This exercise requires panel household-level data on portfolios that are less readily 
available than cross-sectional data. Although most of the observed transitions in 
stockholder status are from being a non-stockholder to being a stockholder, opposite 
transitions are also observed in panel data (Bertaut, 1998). 
  16Transitions out of the stock market make it difficult to sustain the view that there 
are no costs associated with continued stock market participation. Entry fees are sunk 
costs for those who have participated in the stock market: once paid, they allow access to 
the stock market forever. If we try to explain the choice of some households not to hold 
stocks in subsequent periods without reference to any participation costs, we are pushed 
back almost to the same position as before, namely trying to justify zero stockholding in 
the absence of fixed costs. In fact, the task is even more formidable, since we now have 
to justify zero stockholding among households that tend to be older, more educated, and 
richer than those without previous stock market experience.  
It is, of course, still possible to justify temporary absences from the stock market 
even without participation costs. Occasional bad spells of cash on hand may well force 
some households into a situation of zero asset holding where both short sales constraints 
are binding (as discussed above). How often households will be pushed to such corners 
depends on various household characteristics, but mainly on how wealthy they are. In 
saving and portfolio models, the amount of accumulated wealth is heavily influenced by 
the degree of impatience characterizing the household (Deaton, 1991; Carroll, 1997). 
Impatient households, that is those who discount future utility significantly relative to 
current utility, tend to accumulate fewer assets and to run into binding borrowing 
constraints more often. 
Some preliminary idea of how often this happens in theory can be obtained from the 
findings of Haliassos and Michaelides (1999) who calibrate a portfolio model for a 
  17household assumed to have an infinite horizon.
12 Highly impatient infinite-horizon 
households
13 accumulate very little and are predicted to run into binding short sales 
constraints and zero stockholding 35% of the time. More patient households
14 accumulate 
more assets and are predicted to have zero stockholding only 5% of the time. There is 
substantial room both for econometric work to establish the frequency and duration of 
exits from the stock market for various demographic groups, and for computational 
models that handle the thorny problem of participation costs contingent on previous stock 




4.  Participation versus diversification 
Households that participate in the stock market do not necessarily hold well-diversified 
portfolios. It has long been known that household portfolios do not tend to be well 
diversified (e.g., Blume et al., 1974), and this has stood in direct contrast to the 
implications of complete portfolios in very standard models in Finance, such as the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Given the above discussion, it should not be 
difficult to see that entry and participation costs may prove useful for explaining limited 
diversification as well as limited participation. 
                                                 
12 While the assumption of infinite horizons is clearly unrealistic, it has been found in computations that 
policy functions for the infinite-horizon problem are essentially the same as those derived from a finite-
horizon model for young households. 
13 Technically, this refers to households with rate of time preference equal to 10%. 
14 These are assumed to have rate of time preference equal to 4%. 
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the employer firm, in domestic rather than foreign companies, and in newly privatized 
but not in other companies. Holding stocks in one’s employer may be good from the 
employer’s perspective but induces unnecessary positive correlation between labor 
income and portfolio return. Holding of such stocks, however, is significantly facilitated 
by the employer who provides them to employees directly, reducing entry costs both in 
absolute terms and relative to other stocks in the market. 
“Home-equity bias” is the tendency of stockholders of a given country to devote 
most if not all of their stock portfolios to domestic stocks. This tendency has been found 
difficult to explain with reference to the mean-variance properties of foreign stock returns 
compared to those of domestic stocks even after adjusting for exchange rate risk, as well 
as to border restrictions (French and Poterba, 1991; Lewis, 1999). The phenomenon 
would be much easier to explain if there is an additional fixed cost of entering foreign 
stock markets, creating a second hurdle for potential stockholders to overcome. This 
additional cost could arise from more limited familiarity of households with foreign 
companies relative to those operating at home, higher costs of monitoring foreign 
companies from abroad, and lack of understanding of foreign policies and institutions. 
The computational apparatus for a model of a household investing domestically can be 
adapted to handle this case (Michaelides, 2000). 
The case of UK stockholders in privatized utilities who did not spread their 
investments to other companies is also consistent with an entry-cost explanation. The 
new stockholders bought public utility stock only after an extensive advertising 
campaign. There was no similar campaign with regard to other types of stocks, and 
  19investors may have been reluctant to acquire them because of lack of familiarity with 
their properties. 
All three examples suggest that, in addition to general stock market entry costs, 
there may well be significant informational barriers across firms of different types and 
ownership that discourage portfolio diversification. The required size and empirical 
relevance of such costs are yet to be determined. 
 
5.  Portfolio composition puzzles 
Portfolio composition puzzles refer to empirical findings based on household portfolio 
data that cannot be reconciled with existing theoretical models of portfolio behavior. In 
principle, such differences can be due either to poor data or to poor theory (or both). In 
the present context, the quality and detail of available household-level data are such that 
the ball seems to be in the court of theory. We will see that in some cases theory fails to 
explain the data because it does not fully capture the economic forces at work. In other 
cases, theory seems to be pointing in directions that accord with intuition and advice 
typically given by professionals, but households fail to behave in ways that seem optimal. 
The former pose a challenge to theory to find the missing mechanisms at work, while the 
latter probably call for better education of households as to what serves their objectives in 
the best possible way. 
 
  205.1.  Three Portfolio Composition Puzzles 
Comparison of data with existing theoretical models of household portfolios has 
identified three main puzzles regarding portfolio composition.
15 The first is the “portfolio 
specialization puzzle”. Theoretical models imply that it is optimal for small savers and 
for younger savers to specialize their financial asset holdings completely in the asset that 
offers an expected-return premium, namely stocks. Only as they get richer and older 
should they incorporate riskless assets in their portfolios. Indeed, theoretical models 
suggest that young and small savers should utilize borrowing opportunities to increase 
not only current consumption but also stockholding above what it would be in the 
absence of such borrowing opportunities. Yet household-level data clearly show that 
small savers and young savers do not confine their financial asset holdings to stocks and, 
if they do specialize, they tend to hold all their financial wealth in relatively riskless 
assets.  
The second puzzle has to do with how portfolio composition changes as the 
financial resources of the household change. Household-level data tend to imply positive 
effects of both household income and financial wealth on the portfolio share of stocks. 
Yet, existing theoretical models predict exactly the opposite, namely that an improvement 
in the financial resources of the household should lead to a decrease of the portfolio share 
invested in stocks among those who do invest in stocks. 
The third puzzle refers to the effect of age on portfolio composition. Theory 
predicts that, as households age, they should reduce the portfolio share of stocks and 
increase that of the riskless asset for any given level of resources. This is also consistent 
                                                 
15 Contributions in Guiso, Haliassos, Jappelli (2001) show how stocks are combined with other assets in 
household portfolios. 
  21with the advice typically given to households by financial advisors. Yet, the data seem to 
suggest either no effect of age on portfolio composition or a slight increase in the 
portfolio share of stocks as a result of aging. Here the puzzle lies more on the side of 
justifying actual behavior rather than of defending theoretical models, since the 
implications of theory seem to accord with popular intuition. 
 
5.2.  Why does Theory Imply Portfolio Specialization in Stocks? 
Understanding the forces responsible for the portfolio specialization result in theoretical 
models is important not only in its own right, but also because it yields insights as to the 
causes of the other two portfolio composition puzzles. The optimal portfolio share of 
risky assets turns out to depend crucially on the ratio of current assets to the present value 
of the stream of labor incomes (“human wealth”). This ratio is usually quite different in 
static (one-period) models of wealth allocation compared to dynamic intertemporal 
models of household consumption and portfolio choice.  
  When current assets are large relative to human wealth (as in static, one-period 
wealth-allocation models without future labor income), mixed portfolios are optimal. 
When current assets are limited relative to the size of human wealth, models tend to 
predict that portfolio specialization in stocks is optimal. Modern intertemporal models of 
household portfolio choice recognize that households face a stream of future labor 
incomes. Other things equal, the younger the household and the smaller its current cash 
on hand,
 the smaller is the ratio of current wealth to future labor incomes. Thus, the more 
likely it is that the intertemporal model will imply portfolio specialization in stocks.  
  22What makes the ratio of current assets to human wealth relevant for the predicted 
portfolio bias towards stocks? The computational literature has uncovered two 
complementary elements of intuition regarding this bias.
16 The first is the subtle role of 
human wealth in providing a substitute for holdings of the riskless asset. Despite 
uncertainty about future earnings, there is always a minimum level below which earnings 
cannot fall in one’s future working life. Possessing the ability to generate this minimum 
level of earnings is equivalent to holding a safe asset that yields an annual return equal to 
that same amount. The household can thus be viewed as having surrogate holdings of the 
safe asset, even when it does not hold any amounts of the regular safe asset. These 
surrogate holdings reduce the optimal amount of regular riskless asset holdings in the 
portfolio and create an (apparent) bias towards stocks. 
The second point has to do with the ability of stocks to generate future wealth, set 
against their contribution to the riskiness of future consumption. In view of the equity 
premium, stockholders expect to earn more on their stock holdings than on an equal 
amount held in the riskless asset. Young households and those with low current cash on 
hand plan to finance most of future consumption through future labor income. Thus, by 
biasing their portfolios towards stocks, they expect to generate more wealth in the future 
without contributing significantly to the riskiness of future consumption.  
Interestingly, short sales constraints on the two types of assets (safe assets and 
risky stocks) do not eliminate the portfolio specialization puzzle. When they are binding, 
short-sales constraints imply zero holdings of both assets. However, the value of relaxing 
                                                 
16 See Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (1999), and Haliassos and Michaelides (2001). 
  23each constraint is not the same to the constrained household.
17 The constrained household 
would prefer to borrow at the riskless rate, rather than to undertake short sales of stock 
and face a borrowing rate that is both risky and higher in expected value than the riskless 
rate. As resources expand, the constrained household ceases to be willing to borrow at the 
risky rate at some threshold resource level, while it is still willing to borrow at the 
riskless rate. Thus, immediately past that threshold, its holdings of stocks become 
positive, while its riskless asset holdings remain constrained at zero.
18 
  Portfolio specialization survives even when various assumptions of the model are 
relaxed. It is obvious that high risk aversion will not reverse the ranking of constraints. 
The same is true if the household is misinformed about the actual size of the equity 
premium (as long as it perceives a premium).  
An important exception to this list regards households whose earnings tend to 
move closely together with stock returns. These usually have lower demand for stocks, 
because stockholding exacerbates their consumption risk (Heaton and Lucas, 1997). 
Indeed, when faced with short-sales constraints, they may be pushed to a corner with only 
safe assets. However, as discussed in section 2.4 above, observed patterns of participation 
in stockholding among various demographic groups are difficult to reconcile with 




                                                 
17 Technically, the size of the Lagrange multipliers on the two constraints is not the same. 
18 For a technical discussion of this point, see Haliassos and Michaelides (1999). 
19 Haliassos and Michaelides (1999) also show that it remains optimal for households with positive 
correlation between their earnings and stock returns to borrow at the (lower) riskless rate than at the (higher 
expected) risky rate for plausible parameter values when both short-sales constraints are binding. Thus, 
portfolio specialization in stocks continues to be observed for small savers, unless we are willing to assume 
very high positive correlation. 
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The second puzzle arises from the fact that household-level data imply positive effects of 
income and wealth on the portfolio share of stocks, while existing theoretical models 
predict that in increase in resources leads to a decrease in the portfolio share invested in 
stocks. The essence of this theoretical result follows from the discussion of the forces that 
cause the portfolio specialization puzzle. Starting from asset holding completely 
specialized in stocks over a range of cash on hand that can be quite substantial, there may 
be a subsequent range in which the household finds it optimal to include riskless assets in 
its portfolio and not to rely exclusively on stocks. Effectively, at that point the ratio of 
current wealth to human wealth has become sufficiently large to induce an optimal 
portfolio share of stocks between zero and one. 
Utilizing the insights in the previous subsection, this point comes when the overall 
size of financial resources is such that the surrogate holdings of safe assets implied by the 
lower bounds on future earnings are no longer deemed sufficient in relation to the 
holdings of stocks. Moreover, at that point the household has accumulated sufficient 
current resources so as not to be lured by the wealth-generating power of stocks into 
holding a portfolio specialized in stocks. 
 
5.4.  Why does Age Affect Optimal Portfolio Composition? 
Theory predicts that, as households age, they should reduce the portfolio share of stocks 
and increase that of the riskless asset for any given level of resources. This result follows 
from the effect of aging on the ratio of current assets to human wealth. With aging, the 
household experiences a reduction in human wealth since the number of remaining 
  25working years diminishes. Thus, for a given level of cash on hand, aging generates an 
increase in the ratio of current cash on hand to human wealth. This creates an incentive to 
include safe assets in portfolios previously specialized in stocks, so as to replenish some 
of the surrogate safe assets that were lost because of the reduction in the number of 
remaining working years. Moreover, since current assets are larger relative to their 
human wealth, households feel less of a need to rely on the equity premium for 
generating future financial wealth. 
It is not clear that financial advisors have precisely these mechanisms in mind 
when they recommend to aging households to move out of stocks and into safer assets. 
However, these factors can rationalize the concern of financial advisors with the reduced 
length of horizon facing older households.  
 
5.5.  Prospects for Resolving the Portfolio Composition Puzzles 
Unlike the puzzle regarding stock market participation, our understanding of the portfolio 
composition puzzles is quite limited and not much theoretical progress has been made 
towards resolving them in the brief period since they were uncovered. Consequently, the 
discussion regarding portfolio composition puzzles can only be tentative and preliminary. 
There is some empirical evidence pointing to the conclusion that households pay 
much more attention to the participation decision than to the choice of portfolio 
composition. In other words, households appear to care more about investing in the right 
assets than about choosing an optimal mix of assets, let alone about continually 
rebalancing their portfolios. The evidence comes in two pieces. First, there is survey 
evidence, for example in the United States Survey of Consumer Finances, that 
  26households do not rebalance their portfolios often, in particular their stock holdings. 
Responses in the Survey suggest that most households buy stocks and then refrain from 
trading stocks for long periods of time.  
The second piece of evidence refers to the extent to which households optimize 
their asset selection and portfolio composition in view of the tax code and changes 
therein. In this context, James Poterba (2001) observes that households appear more 
concerned about which assets to hold than about the optimal portfolio mix dictated by the 
tax system. In some sense, this is even stronger evidence of inertia. Not rebalancing the 
stock portfolio in response to stock market movements could perhaps be justified by 
reference to transactions costs that dwarf the return benefits of continual rebalancing and 
excessive churning. It is more difficult to justify the choice of suboptimal portfolio 
composition and portfolio inertia when households suffer tax consequences as a result. 
The leading explanation for the stockholding participation puzzle is fixed costs of 
entry and participation in the stock market. Existing research on the minimum cost size 
that would be sufficient to deter entry assumes that households know about the range of 
available financial assets, form a perception of participation costs (that need not be 
objectively accurate), and compare costs to expected benefits of stock market 
participation. The main finding in this literature is that, if households do know about all 
available assets, then relatively small costs can deter entry. Recently, survey evidence has 
emerged (e.g., in the case of Italy) suggesting that a sizeable fraction of households are 
not even aware of the full range of assets available to them. These information barriers 
form a more fundamental block to stock market entry, since they prevent households 
from even contemplating stock investment. 
  27Could fixed costs of entry and participation in the stock market be extended to 
account for puzzles regarding conditional portfolio shares? Clearly, ignorance of stocks 
alone cannot account for anything but a zero portfolio share of stocks. However, it is 
possible that a household has passively acquired stocks, through inheritance or through a 
company reward scheme, and does not know how to trade this asset or how to figure out 
its optimal portfolio share given the household’s circumstances. In either case, observed 
portfolio shares of stocks are likely to differ from optimal shares predicted by theory and 
to be largely insensitive to changes in wealth, income, age, or some other 
demographics.
20 With detailed household-level data, it should be possible to devise 
empirical tests of the extent to which changes in portfolio shares are attributable to 
changes in market valuations of already acquired assets rather than conscious rebalancing 
on the part of households.  
Ignorance and cost perceptions of households are not immutably fixed, but can be 
influenced by information provided through issuers of stock and financial practitioners. 
Newly privatized companies or companies that want to widen their stockholder base have 
clear incentives to disseminate information to potential stockholders. So do mutual fund 
companies that want to advertise the range of funds they run. Whether such supply-side 
provision of information will be effective in reducing ignorance and perceived costs of 
participation and of portfolio rebalancing will crucially depend not only on the amount of 
disseminated information but also on whether households trust this information. In view 
of the incentives of firms and of mutual fund companies to oversell their stocks or stock 
                                                 
20 The same effect could be observed in less extreme cases of ignorance, namely when households do 
not themselves know how to rebalance their portfolios but know that they can purchase financial advice or 
brokerage services (including participation in a mutual fund). High perceived costs of acquiring reliable 
financial advice or brokerage services could deter portfolio rebalancing, even if these cost perceptions are 
not accurate. 
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promote trust on the part of households. 
 
6.  Some conclusions for practitioners 
Perhaps the clearest message from household portfolio theory is that fixed costs faced by 
potential or actual investors represent the key factor in stock market participation or non-
participation of households. Such costs are created not only by the fees charged by 
brokers and mutual funds for entry and for continuing participation, but also by inertia 
and ignorance about all or different stockholding opportunities. Inertia and ignorance can 
normally be overcome through financial education programs. Such programs, ranging 
from mass advertising to tailor-made training workshops, can be instrumental in alerting 
households to stockholding opportunities and expanding the customer base. 
The recent experience in the US and in the UK can yield some useful pointers in 
this context. The successful privatization experience in the UK suggests that persistent 
advertising can be quite helpful in encouraging household participation. So does the 
takeoff in mutual-fund participation in the US in the 1990s, which took place only after 
about a decade of aggressive mass mailings and other advertising by US mutual funds. 
Bayer, Bernheim and Scholz (1996) studied the effects of financial education on getting 
employees to sign up for new types of retirement accounts in the US. They found that 
employer-sponsored seminars, especially frequent ones, have been much more effective 
than all other ways of disseminating information. They were unable to detect any effects 
of written materials, such as newsletters and summary plan descriptions, regardless of 
frequency. 
  29If entry and participation costs are important deterrents, mutual funds and other 
institutional investors should also strive to simplify investment procedures and maximize 
the degree of financial guidance, book-keeping and other services offered to their 
investors. This will induce households not only to participate in the first place, but also to 
stay with the fund even when the stock market goes through difficult times and choices 
become more confusing and riskier, as currently. 
Advertising campaigns or simplified procedures can be significantly reinforced by 
word of mouth. There is some relevant ongoing research on the influence of a 
household’s “reference group” on portfolio behavior (Gollier, 2001c). The idea advanced 
in this research is that consumption is not only valued on its own, but also in comparison 
to consumption in the household’s reference group. Since portfolio returns are important 
in influencing consumption, this may induce households to imitate the portfolio behavior 
of their peers. They will thus be more likely to invest significant amounts in stocks if 
other households in their reference group invest in the stock market and make gains. 
From the point of view of practitioners, targeting peer groups may be effective for 
promoting not only smoking and alcohol consumption but also other dangerous activities 
such as stockholding. 
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